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Summary
Despite macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms, employment problems have persisted in Latin America.  The
1990s have seen a slowdown in the rate of job creation, unemployment rates have stagnated at about 10%; informal sector
employment has expanded, and increases in real wages have been particularly favorable to skilled workers.  The purpose of
this article is to explain this apparent labor paradox.  The main conclusion is that economic cycles explain the fluctuations
of employment and unemployment rate (around their structural levels), while price stabilizations and structural reforms have
affected the composition of labor demand and relative wages. 
The transmission mechanism connecting the new macro policies with the labor results has been as follows:  
(1)  Stabilization and reforms produced capital inflows and an appreciation in the foreign exchange rate; it has cut the
user cost of capital and increased the productivity of the factors. 
(2)  Consequently, relative prices evolved in favor of the nontradable sectors, and stocks of physical capital, as a percentage
of GDP, have risen.
The mechanism has had four effects on labor:
(1)  The role of employment in nontradables has risen in response to the signals from relative prices and the more intensive
use of machinery in tradable sectors. 
(2)  Informal sector employment has grown due to the nature of the jobs in nontradable sectors and the relative decline in the
demand for unskilled labor. 
(3)  Demand for labor has shifted toward skilled workers because of the increase in stocks of machinery, the adoption of new
technologies, and the expansion of the nontradable sectors, which use skilled workers more intensively.
(4)  Lastly, wage differentials have increased because of the rise in relative demand for skilled labor. 
Structural reforms, particularly the “opening up” of the region’s economies, have not had the effect of raising demand for and
relative remuneration of unskilled labor as had been hoped in the light of conventional theories of  competitive advantages in
international trade. 
These results raise a variety of policy questions:
(1)  Since workers are now more exposed to factors of unstability, there is a greater demand for macro stability and social
protection.  How is the demand to be satisfied? 
(2)  In Latin America’s tax structures payroll taxes and fiscal incentives for investment are commonly found together. Are
these structures suitable to promote unskilled labor demand and reduce wage differentials?
(3)  Should public expenditure in higher education be expanded in order to address the growing scarcity of skilled manpower?1. Introduction
During the 1990s, Latin America has recovered the macroeconomic stability it had lost in the previous decade
and countries have adopted a set of structural reforms that have enabled them to boost economic growth rates
and reduce volatility (IADB, 1997)..  But the new economic model seems not to have fully solved the labor
problems1
♦   The rate of growth in employment has been lower in the 1990s than in the latter half of the 1980s, both in
the region as a whole and in most individual countries (Figure 1)2 ;
♦   No reduction has been achieved in the average unemployment rate in the region during the 1990s.  It has
remained at about 10 % (with increases in some countries and reductions in others, but showing no clear
pattern).  Furthermore, since there have been appreciable increases in unemployment in some of the large
countries (most notably in Argentina), the percentage of unemployed Latin American workers has jumped
from 5% at the end of the 1980s to 8% in recent years (Figures 2 and 3);
                                                
1A more complete description of the stylized facts of the employment problem in Latin America can be found in the accompanying article
by Lora and MÆrquez (1998).
2The sources of the series used in the charts and the econometric exercises are listed in Appendix 1.3
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♦   Nor has any reduction in the rates of informal employment been observed.  On the contrary, according to
ILO statistics, in 1996 they were higher than in 1990 in all countries for which data is available.  In some
cases, the changes assume real importance.  (Figure 4);
♦   Real wages have behaved better in the 1990s than in the second half of the 1980s in most countries, because
they are either rising more rapidly or falling more slowly.  However, real wage levels in some countries are still
below those of the early 1980s (Figures 5 and 6);
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♦   Of greater
concern from the social and distributive standpoint is the circumstance that in some countries, the increases
in real wages in the 1990s have been particularly beneficial to skilled workers vis-￿-vis the unskilled. 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru are three especially prominent cases in which widening wage gaps, based on skill
levels, have been observed.  In other countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica), wage differentials have
remained largely unchanged (Figure 7).3
Given this behavior by labor-related variables, it is not surprising that the number one concern of Latin Americans
                                                
3   Two measurements of wage differentials are used in this article: between white-collar and blue-collar workers in industrial sectors,
and between workers who have at least a high-school education and the rest of the workers.  See the accompanying article by Duryea
and SzØkely (1998) in which other ways to measure wage inequalities are used and it is shown that in all the cases examined, the
concentration of earnings, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has increased.6
is the shortage of jobs, and that the opinion has become widespread in Latin America that economic and social
progress has ground to a halt despite the economic reforms.4
At first glance, the results in terms of labor appear paradoxical, since it was to be expected that macroeconomic
stabilization and structural reforms would facilitate the creation of higher-productivity jobs by boosting economic
growth and investment and bringing about a more efficient allocation of productive resources, thanks to the
improved functioning of markets.  There is no doubt that the stabilization programs and reforms of the past
decade did indeed produce the desired effect on GDP growth.  Several studies5 have found that this effect took
the form of an increase of about two points per year in growth of GDP.  According to these studies, this increase
was made possible by the improved functioning of the markets and the higher levels of efficiency which, in turn,
resulted from freer mechanisms of assignment of productive resources.  Consequently, there is a ￿labor paradox￿
that demands an explanation; it is not obvious why better macro and micro functioning has not produced more
perceptible improvements in the labor field.
The purpose of this article is to show that the principal changes in the labor markets in the past decade are related
to macroeconomic transformations generated by the processes of stabilization and structural reform.  The
remainder of this article is organized as follows: in the section following this introduction, we discuss the
relationship between employment and economic growth.  In Section 3, we summarize the principal changes that
have taken place in the composition of the demand for labor.  In Section 4, we show the effects of the principal
macro phenomena.  In Section 5, we tie those effects to the changes in the composition of demand for labor. 
Section 6 discusses, very briefly, the different channels by which trade patterns influence labor variables.  The
article ends with a section on potential topics for a debate on economic and social policy as suggested by our
analysis.  The appendices at the end of this paper provide statistical details on changes in the composition of the
demand for labor in six Latin American countries during the past decade, and furnish econometric support for
some of the key relationships between labor results and the macro variables derived from this analysis.  The
appendices also include a short description of a simulation model that helps to understand the differences in
results among countries with different degrees of rigidity in their labor markets, and among countries at different
development levels.
                                                
4  For more details about these perceptions, see Lora and MÆrquez (1998).
5  Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997); FernÆndez and Montiel (1997); and Lora and Barrera (1997).7
2. Economic growth, employment, and unemployment
More growth, less employment?
How can we explain the fact that the higher economic growth rates of the 1990s have not translated into a faster
pace of job creation, and reductions in unemployment?  Average economic growth in the region has increased
from 2.7 percent in the second half of the 1980s to 4 percent between 1991 and 1997.  However, employment
has risen only 2.8 percent during the 1990s, 0.5 percent less than in the late 1980s. However, can it be said that
the changes in economic policy during the last decade were misguided, since they have led to a situation of
￿growth without employment?￿
In order to answer these questions, it is desirable to confirm, in the first place, that average rates of growth in
employment in each country since 1980 have indeed tended to reflect the pace of expansion of the labor force
while, when seen from year to year, growth in employment has oscillated around those average rates in response
to fluctuations in the business cycle.  As we can see from the econometric results shown in Appendix 3,
employment elasticity with respect to the labor supply is, with a very high probability, around 1, while employment
elasticity with respect to the economic growth rate stands at about 0.3.  It is important to note, however, that this
sensitivity of employment to economic growth is strictly a short-term relationship, since a growth rate in
employment that differs from the pace of growth in the labor supply cannot be sustained indefinitely.6
Having established this basic hypothesis, we must then ask whether there is evidence that the reaction of
employment to changes in GDP is different than before, now that countries have adopted the new economic
policies.  The answer is negative: no significant change has been detected in employment elasticity with respect
to greater or lesser growth in GDP (either above or below its permanent rate) since the policies of openness were
adopted or other important changes made in economic policy (to be described briefly later in this article).7
How, then, can we explain why employment grew more slowly in the presence of the higher growth rates that have
prevailed in the 1990s?  The answer is that the more moderate pace of growth in employment reflects the slower
pace of expansion of the labor force8, while the higher rates of permanent economic growth have been the result
of productivity increases.  As we will see later, structural reforms produced a recovery in the rates of growth in
total productivity of the factors that explains the bulk of the increase in economic growth rates.  By definition,
this gain could not have been reflected in greater growth in employment, but the fluctuations around today￿s
higher rates of economic growth have effects on employment similar to those observed in the past.
In short, (1) the fluctuations of the growth rates of employment are associated, as before, to the economic cycle;
(2) the fact that employment growth trends reflects a more moderate expansion of the working forces of the
countries, and (3) it is correct to state that the permanent gains that produced the reforms did not generate jobs,
since those gains were derived from productivity increases.
                                                
6  This is why the regressions use as an explanatory variable not the rate of growth in GDP, but the deviations from the GDP growth
rate with respect to its permanent trend (which is obtained by a non-lineal method, as explained in Appendix 1 on the definition of
variables).
7  There may be different ways to establish the moment when macroeconomic and structural policies were changed, in order to define
the ￿before￿ and ￿after￿ periods that are needed in order to make this verification.  In the regressions shown in the appendix, we use
the year of the apertura. (IADB, 1996, Part 2, Chapter 2) as a criterion, since in most countries the other reforms centered around this
reform.  However, we have also determined that the results do not change when the cutoff point is defined in other ways.
8   A result that is confirmed via the exercise in breakdown of the changes in the growth in employment presented in Appendix 2 of
the introductory article by Lora and MÆrquez (1998).8
Changes of unemployment rates
Implicit throughout this line of reasoning is that rates of unemployment must have fluctuated around relatively
stable levels in each country, and that these fluctuations must also have reflected the cycles in economic activity.
 Is this implication correct?  What factors have influenced the behavior of unemployment?
There are three groups of factors that cause unemployment rates to vary: structural, cyclical, and frictional.  By
structural factors we mean the sociodemographic characteristics (such as age, fertility, and education), and
institutional aspects (such as labor laws, minimum wages, etc.) that determine the rate at which participants enter
and leave the labor market and the ease with which they can find employment.  In the following discussion we
shall set aside these factors, which change slowly over time and have been analyzed in other articles.9  The cyclical
factors are the ones related to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity, and the frictional ones are associated
with reassignments of labor resources owing to changes in the composition of production, production techniques,
or methods of work organization.
Leaving aside the structural factors, it can be verified that the fluctuation in unemployment rates in countries of
the region has been closely tied to cyclical and frictional factors.10  For each point of decline in economic growth,
the unemployment rate rises by approximately a quarter of a point per year.  In Latin America, periods of
deceleration typically bring with them reductions of 6 points in growth with respect to boom periods.  This leads
to increases in the unemployment rate on the order of 1.5 points per year during the deceleration phase, and vice
versa.  There is no way to measure frictional factors directly. In the econometric exercises we have used two
indicators: one that measures sectoral imbalances in economic growth, and another that attempts to measure the
speed of technical and organizational change as the change in the ratio between the stock of imported machinery
and the permanent product.11 Although both have the expected sign ￿greater friction, greater unemployment￿
only the second variable is significant and robust.  A 1% increase in that ratio (above its trend in each country)
turns out to be associated with something less than a 0.1 point rise in unemployment.  As we will see later, the
recovery of investment has been influenced by macro and structural policies, so it is correct to state that, through
this channel, these policies may have had a transitory affect on unemployment rates.  On average, this effect may
have been responsible for an increase of about half a point in unemployment rates in the 1990s, but in countries
where the process of renovation of machinery was very vigorous, as in Argentina between 1991 and 1995, the
resulting increase may have been as great as 3 points.
We have seen that short-term fluctuations of employment growth and unemployment rates have been closely
associated to cyclical and frictional factors,which can be regarded as transitory in nature, while the more permanent
changes in the rates of growth in employment have reflected the trends in the expansion of the labor force.  One
should not conclude from this, however, that the apertura [the ￿opening￿ of the economies] and, in general, the
set of macro policies adopted in Latin America during the past decade have had no impact on the labor market,
                                                
9  In Duryea and SzØkely (1998) these sociodemographic factors are discussed, and the institutional factors are treated in MÆrquez and
PagØs (1998).
10  See Table A3.2 of Appendix 3.  We have not reported estimates including demographic factors (participation by females and by age
groups) and institutional factors (index of job protection according to MÆrquez and PagØs, 1998) because these yielded very low levels
of significance, but without affecting the robustness of the other coefficients.
11  This association has ample support in both theoretical and empirical literature (Pissarides, 1997; Wood, 1997) and is a central
component of the changes in the composition of the demand for labor that are discussed later.9
employment, or pay scales.  The remainder of this article is intended to show precisely this: that the most
important effects have been not so much on the labor aggregates, but on their composition.  This is a promising
avenue of inquiry, not just to satisfy academic curiosity, but because perhaps it is there that we are most likely to
find the explanation for the serious dissatisfaction displayed by Latin Americans with respect to the consequences
for labor of the new policies.10
3. What changes have occurred in the composition of demand for labor?
The composition of the demand for labor in Latin America has undergone four significant changes in the
1990s:
♦   Labor demand in the nontradable sectors (construction and services) has increased in terms of total labor
demand.  Employment in these sectors climbed from 58.4% of total employment in 1990 to 63% five years
later (Figure 8).  Only in Brazil has the trend been different.  Despite this exception, nontradable sectors have
typically generated all the expansions in employment seen during the 1990s.
♦   The role of
informal
employment has increased (as we saw earlier, in Figure 4).  By ￿informal employment￿ we mean self-
employment, jobs in microenterprises,12 and domestic service.  In 1996, informal sector employment
accounted for 57.4% of total employment, nearly six points more than in 1990.  In Latin America as a whole,
the expansion in the number of jobs in the informal sector during this period was equivalent to 80% of the
net increase in employment.  In Argentina and Mexico, this coefficient was greater than 100%, since those
countries experienced a net elimination of formal jobs13.
♦   The share represented by government employment has fallen from 15.3% in 1990 to 13.2% in 1995.  In seven
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay), direct employment in the
public sector fell in absolute terms, sometimes very significantly.  It is estimated that in Argentina the
reduction in government employment was equivalent to 11% of total formal employment, and for Peru this
figure was 7% (Figure 9).
                                                
12  Employing no more than five or ten workers, depending on the statistical conventions adopted by each country.
13 Keep in mind, however, that in 1996, these two countries were still experiencing the effects of the ￿tequila￿ crisis.11
♦   The demand for skilled labor has increased with respect to unskilled labor.  Unlike previous changes in
composition, this is not a directly-observable phenomenon, since the changes in the composition of
employment between skilled and unskilled labor  necessarily tend to reflect the changes in the relative supply
of skilled workers, which has increased throughout the region owing to the expansion in education (see Table
1).  Nevertheless, since relative wages paid to skilled workers have increased (or declined only slightly) instead
of shrinking markedly, the implication is that the relative demand for skilled workers has risen even more
rapidly than the supply.  Assuming an elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers of 1.5,14 one
can conclude that relative demand for skilled workers has increased at rates between 2.3% and 7.4% annually
for the group of countries under consideration (Costa Rica and Mexico being the extreme cases).  To put it
another way, the demand for labor has not expanded proportionately for all types of work, but has shown a
bias toward the more skilled workers.  That is why, although these individuals are increasingly plentiful in
relative terms, they receive proportionately higher wages.15
In short, the demand for labor in Latin America during the past decade has experienced four changes in
composition, and this is generally true for all the countries.  These changes are the growing preponderance of the
services sector [terciarización],16 the increasing importance of the informal sector, privatization, and a preference
for workers who have higher skill levels.
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14  Taken from Robbins (1996). See Hamermesh (1993) for a brief description of estimates of elasticities of labor substitution and
demand.
15  This is true even after one corrects for changes in average levels of education between the groups of ￿skilled￿ and ￿unskilled￿
workers, respectively.  In these comparisons, workers are defined as ￿skilled￿ if they have at least finished high school.  The
calculations presented in Table 1 take the changes in education level into account.
16  Henceforth this term will be used as equivalent to the increase in participation of employment in the nontradable sectors (although,
strictly speaking, this is incorrect since construction￿a nontradable sector par excellence￿is not a tertiary sector.)12
 (annual)
Argentina (1980-96) 3,7% -1,7% 3,3%
Bolivia (1986-95) 3,9% 1,8% 4,7%
Costa Rica (1981-95) 3,1% -0,8% 2,3%
México (1984-94) 5,1% 4,5% 7,4%
Venezuela (1981-95) 6,8% -0,6% 5,1%
Note: Changes take account of schooling changes and assume the elasticity sustitution of  skilled vs unskilled labor demand 1.513
4. What have been the macro consequences of stabilization and structural reforms?
During the past decade, economic policy throughout Latin America has been aimed at consolidating macro
stability and facilitating the functioning of the markets.
Latin America has completely recovered the stability it had lost in the 1980s.  In 1997, the average rate of inflation
fell below 10%, and only one country recorded inflation higher than 30%.  Also the kind of fiscal adjustment
needed to back up this ￿deflation￿ has been made.  Fiscal accounts were virtually at equilibrium on average in the
region during the first years of this decade; in 1996, the deficit for the entire region did not exceed 2% of GDP
and only two countries had fiscal deficits larger than 5% of GDP.  Although many countries in the region face
major fiscal challenges in the near term, the 1990s have not been a period of huge or destabilizing fiscal deficits.
To facilitate market functioning and reduce government interference, Latin America has adopted a set of structural
reforms in its trade, financial, and tax policy, and in privatization.17  The more profound changes initially took
place in trade and financial policies.  In fact, restrictions on imports have been virtually abolished, and tariffs have
been cut from 41.6% in years prior to the reforms, to 13.7% in 1995.  Steps taken toward liberalization in the
financial realm have led to the lifting of controls on interest rates, dismantling of directed-credit systems, and
reductions to less than 20% in bank reserve requirements in most of Latin American countries.  Although less far-
reaching, remarkable progress has also been made in simplification and modernization of the tax codes in many
countries since the mid-1980s.  In the area of privatization, although initial progress was initially concentrated in
a small group of countries, now at least 14 countries have, in some year, carried out privatization operations worth
more than 1% of GDP.  Brazil, with the privatization program it launched in 1996, could move to the top of the
list of all the countries in terms of accrued transactions.  There are also new and important developments in
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and other countries.
In comparison with all these structural changes, which have made the operations of commodities and financial
markets more flexible, labor reforms have been less far-reaching, except in a few countries.18
Well then, through which channels have these macro and structural policies impacted the changes in composition
of the demand for labor that we identified above?  In the first place, it is useful to point out that new policies have
given rise to heavier capital inflows, an appreciation in real exchange rates, lower user costs for machinery and
equipment, and increases in productivity.  As we will see later, these four effects together have raised relative
prices of nontradable goods and expanded the stock of machinery and equipment, especially of imported origin.
                                                
17  A full description of the scope of the reforms and some of their macroeconomic and distributive effects can be found in IADB
(1996), Part 2.
18  See, in this regard, IADB (1996), Part Two, Chapter 6.14
Capital Inflows
During most of the 1990s, the supply of capital to Latin America has been abundant and has extended to
practically all the countries.  The Mexican crisis that broke out at the end of 1994 and continued until mid-1995
caused a temporary interruption in the supply, but in only a few countries.  More recently, the financial and foreign
exchange crisis in Asia did not prevent Latin America from receiving, in 1997, more than half of all capital flows
to the developing world, or keep these inflows from reaching record levels, estimated at US$73 billion. 
Notwithstanding the vicissitudes of international financial markets, the international situation has permitted
heavier capital flows, especially to countries that have adopted price stabilization and structural reforms.19  Price
stabilization programs of the 1990s used exchange anchors that (at least temporarily) helped reduce the exchange
risks and, on many occasions, created wide differentials in financial yields in those countries with respect to the
United States.20  Then too, structural reforms have reduced the threat of confiscation and freezing of financial
foreign funds and, what is perhaps even more important, they have opened up new opportunities for international
financial resources to make profits. Privatization programs in particular have held a powerful attraction for foreign
capital.21
Exchange Rate Appreciation
Largely due to the heftier capital inflows, real exchange rates in many countries have risen since the end of the
1980s or the early 1990s.22   Also contributing directly to this development are price stabilization programs, both
those based on the exchange rate and those that used monetary anchors.23
Only seven out of a total of 26 countries experienced a real devaluation of their exchange rates between 1990 and
199624 and this was, on average, only 1.3% annually (the extreme case being Trinidad and Tobago, where the
cumulative real devaluation was 17%).  In contrast, 17 countries exhibited real appreciation averaging 4.1 %
annually.25  In seven countries, including Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Suriname and
Uruguay, the rate of exchange has appreciated more than 25% between 1990 and 199626 (Table 2). In some
countries, the effect of the larger inflows of capital on the real exchange rate has been moderated, at least
temporarily, by the accumulation of international reserves.
Table 2. The Magnitude of the Appretiations in the 1990's
(percent changes of the real exchange rate index between 1990 and 1996)
                                                
19 Table A3.3 of Appendix 3 presents econometric confirmation that the inflows of capital, by country, have been determined by their
structural reforms.
20  See, in this regard, IADB (1996), Part 1, and the references contained therein.
21  It has been estimated that privatization programs generated, directly, about 20% of direct foreign investment in Latin America
between 1990 and 1995 and, indirectly, nearly as much, by stimulating new investment.  See Sader (1993) and IADB (1996) Part Two,
Chapter 7.
22  See the evidence presented in the econometric appendix mentioned earlier.
23  The following countries have used exchange anchors to cut the inflation rate from levels in excess of 60% (year program started
shown in parenthesis): Argentina (1991), Brazil (1994), Ecuador (1992), Guatemala (1991), Nicaragua (1991), Surinam (1995) and
Uruguay (1991).  In addition, many other countries have made at least partial use of the exchange regime to restrain or reduce
moderate inflation rates, i.e., those lower than 60%.  See IADB (1996), Part 1.
24  Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago.
25  The two remaining countries, not included in the calculations, are the Bahamas and Belize, where the real rate of exchange varied
less than 1% between 1990 and 1996.
26 Venezuela joined this list in 1997, when its currency appreciated by around 30% in real terms.15
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Annual average 6.4% 2.6% 0.0% 1.8%
Accumulated
average in the 90’s
32.9% 14.6% 0.3% 11.2%
Source: BID (1997), Apendix 1.
Reduction in the user cost of capital
A third important effect of the new economic policies has been the lowering of the user cost of physical capital.
 The cost of using capital is determined not only by the relative price of capital goods, but also by the other costs--
financial, tariff, and tax--that must be incurred in order to be able to purchase and mobilize an additional unit of
capital goods.  Therefore, the appreciation in the real rate of exchange has been an important, although not the
only, cause of the reduction in the user cost of capital in the 1990s.  Other factors have been (1) the reduction in
real interest rates, expressed in local currency, charged for the mix of financing that companies use (a circumstance
also influenced by the upward trend in the exchange rate); (2) the reductions in customs tariffs; and (3) the
lowering of marginal tax rates.  The average user cost of capital (calculated for a sample of 13 countries) fell from
levels above 20% in the second half of the 1980s, to rates below 10% since 1990 (Figure 10).  Almost two-thirds
of this drop was due to a reduction in financial costs; the rest came, in similar proportions, from the decrease in
tariffs, lower internal tax rates, and the appreciation in the exchange rate.16
Higher productivity
In fourth place, it is interesting to point out the effect on productivity of the stabilization programs and structural
reforms.  The growing emphasis that governments have placed on lowering the inflation rate, and the policies
adopted to make markets more responsive, is the result of their having been persuaded that the lower growth rates
experienced in the 1980s were due to a deterioration in efficiency, either because of steps taken to deal with the
debt crisis, or because of the exhaustion of the earlier model of import substitution and government intervention.
  Recent studies have shown that stabilization programs and reforms have indeed generated increases in
productivity, and that this has been the principal means by which growth rates have been raised.  Using a synthetic
measurement of structural reforms,27 we show, in Figure 11, the relationship between the magnitude of the
reforms and improvements in the behavior of total factor productivity.  Countries that undertook more
comprehensive reforms, such as Peru, Nicaragua, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, or El Salvador (possibly
because they started out with less suitable policies) exhibited the biggest increases in the productivity growth rate.
 More systematic econometric evidence not only confirms this relationship, but also supports the thesis that the
stabilization of inflation rates (and, especially the reduction in the volatility of those rates) was essential to the
recovery of productivity in many countries.28
                                                
27  Described in the document by Lora (1997) presented at the 1997 meeting of the Board of Governors of the IADB.
28  See, in this regard, the article by Lora and Barrera (1997) presented at the 1997 meeting of the Board of Governors of the IADB,
and IADB (1997), Part 2.
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All the evidence indicates that the productivity increases were not homogeneous among sectors; rather, they
concentrated especially in the tradable sectors that are open to international competition.  Indeed, as Pissarides
(1997) argues, the opening up of trade induces technological change and higher productivity in the tradable sectors
because (1) it exposes producers to the technological and capital goods use practices followed in the more
advanced countries; (2) it sparks a need to compete, to innovate (or disappear); and (3) it makes imported inputs
and capital goods cheaper.  Detailed microeconomic studies of the Mexican case have shown that trade reforms
heightened the competitiveness of the tradables by demanding that they make more rapid technological changes.29
 There is also evidence of productivity gains in the privatized sectors, particularly in the cases of Argentina, Chile,
and Mexico, three of the region￿s biggest privatizers.30
                                                
29  Cragg, Epelbaum (1996).  In the words of the authors, the commercial reforms produced ￿an import-catalyzed technological
change￿ that was reinforced by cheaper capital goods and the appreciation in the exchange rate.
30 The Argentine case was studied by Chisari, Estache and Romeo (1997).  The Chilean and Mexican cases are analyzed (along with the
case of the United Kingdom) in Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1994).18
Increase in the relative price of nontradables
We have seen that stabilization programs and the structural reforms had four effects: they fostered larger capital
inflows, helped raise the value of real exchange rates, led to reductions in the user cost of capital, and produced
increases in productivity, especially in the tradable  sectors.  The combination of these situations led, in turn, to
an increase in relative prices of nontradable goods and an expansion in the stock of imported machinery and
equipment (See Diagram 1 for a summary of these relationships.)31  In theoretical models, economists customarily
identify the real exchange rate with the relative prices of the nontradable to the tradable goods.  As is proven in
the regressions of Appendix 3, although this relationship exists, it is far from being one of identity. This is due to
the method of measuring the two concepts.  In usual measurements of the real exchange rate, one is implicitly
comparing the cost of one country￿s typical market basket of goods with that of its trading partners, measuring
both of them in a common currency.  On the other hand, in examining the relationship between relative prices
of nontradable goods and tradables goods, one is comparing the prices (usually the purchase prices) of the goods
of both types within the subject country.  Strictly speaking, a multitude of conditions would have to be satisfied
in order for the two measurements to produce identical results.  In any case, for our purposes, the relative prices
of the nontradables are more relevant than the real rate of exchange, because they reflect more directly the
incentives that producers and workers encounter in determining whether or not to orient themselves toward the
nontradable sectors.
Picture 1. Macro origin of the changes in labor demand composition
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31 Econometric support for some of these relationships is also found in the econometric appendix mentioned earlier.19
Larger stock of machinery
Following the reduction that occurred in the 1980s, the stock of machinery and equipment has risen substantially
during the 1990s, especially in the larger countries (Figure 12).  This trend reflects, with some lag, the reduction
in the user cost of capital.  However, in several countries other factors also played a very important role and also
helped stimulate investment.  These included liberation of imports (which made it easier to buy machinery and
also created new investment opportunities); expansion of sources of credit for producers, credit that had
previously been rationed at the prevailing rates; a reduction in factors that create economic and legal uncertainty;
and gains in productivity.32
                                                
32  The econometric appendix shows that both investment in (imported) machinery and the stocks of that machinery have been
influenced in a positive and very significant way by an index of structural reforms that captures several of these effects synthetically,
since it gathers information on tariffs, tax rates, degree of financial freedom, and privatization.20
5.  How have these macro phenomena impacted the composition of the demand for
       labor?
Growing preponderance of the services sector
Now that we have described the macro scenario, the changes that have taken place in the composition of the
demand for labor are easy to understand.  First, it is clear that the increase in relative prices of nontradable goods,
observed in many countries and whose origin has already been explained, led to a reallocation of productive
resources, particularly labor, toward those sectors.  In other words, the increase created a terciarizaci￿n33 or ￿de-
industrialization￿ of labor.  This relationship is demonstrated  in the regressions in Appendix 3.34  As observed
there, the ￿de-industrialization￿ of employment was also induced by the increase in the stock of machinery and
equipment, which, presumably, was concentrated in the tradable sector, where it replaced workers (especially
unskilled labor, as we will see later), thus contributing to the reallocation of labor toward the nontradable sector.
Consistent with these results, looking at a sample of 18 Latin American countries we find that the rate of growth
of employment in manufacturing has depended directly, and very significantly, on the real exchange rate and on
the rate of growth of GDP.35  In making these estimates, the objective was to determine whether the apertura
(measured in terms of both tariff levels and the coefficient of trade) had effects on industrial employment additional
to those captured via growth and the real exchange rate.  The answer proved to be negative: although perhaps if
adverse effects did occur, they were limited and of very little statistical significance.
Growing role of the informal sector
Owing to the predominance of small production units in the nontradable sectors, especially construction, retailing,
and personal services, the rates of informal employment are higher than in the tradable sectors, as can be seen in
Table 3.36  Consequently, the shift of employment to the services sector has been accompanied by a greater role
for informal employment37.  Note that under these circumstances, an increase in informal activity is not evidence
of weakness in the demand for labor, nor of the presence of any kind of economic rigidities.  Strictly speaking,
and contrary to the usual assumption, it is not even evidence of a deterioration in conditions on the job market.
 As recent studies have shown, in economies where the labor markets are, in practice, flexible ￿as is usually the
case in Latin America￿ there is no foundation for traditional theories that consider the informal economy solely
as a residual sector, barely integrated with the rest of the economy and a last resort for workers who lack other
job options.  Not only has it been found that labor mobility between the formal and informal economies is fairly
high; it has also been established that, in economies that have little wage stickiness, informal employment tends
to rise during economic boom periods, when employment options improve.38  The informal economy may prove
attractive for reasons of organization, flexibility in hours and pay systems, and as a means for taking advantage
                                                
33  We use this term because it is common in the region, even though its is not very accurate because the construction sector (a nontradable
par excellence) is not part of the tertiary sector.  It should also be mentioned that some services sectors are highly tradable (tourism, for
example) while a very few goods (apart from construction) are not very tradable at all.
34  See the column that explains industrial employment (i.e., in the tradable sector) as a percentage of urban employment.  This variable
declines as capital stock grows and increases with the relative price of the tradables.
35  These exercises, taken from the aforementioned study by MÆrquez and PagØs (1997), done at the IADB, did not analyze the effect of
investment in machinery and equipment.  See Table A3.5 in Appendix 3.
36  Although this is not necessarily the case in a comparison with agriculture, the comparison is of little relevance, given the usual
criteria for defining ￿informality￿ and the fact that labor mobility between the countryside and the city is much lower than between
the urban tradable and nontradable sectors.
37  The econometric appendix demonstrates that investment in machinery and equipment increases informal sector activity and self-
employment, while an increase in the relative price of tradables reduces it.  These effects are the opposite of the impact these variables
have on employment in the tradable (industrial) sector.
38  For the case of Mexico, see Maloney (1997) and Maloney and Cunningham (1997).21
of specific individual experiences or abilities.39
Bias toward skilled labor
Owing to the characteristics of the demand for labor in the services sector, terciarización has also been associated
with a higher relative demand for skilled labor.  Indeed, Table 3 shows that, with few exceptions, the services
sectors are more labor-intensive (per unit of aggregate value) and use proportionately more skilled labor than the
tradable sectors.  This is valid even when one excludes the government from the nontradable sectors (taking into
account that the government is highly labor-intensive, and especially intensive in skilled labor).  The relative
decline in government employment might have diminished the bias toward skilled labor, but this is not actually
the case.  In Bolivia, for example, the average skills level of government employees rose appreciably between 1986
and 1995, so that skilled jobs in the government increased by 10% per year, while unskilled jobs fell by 7% per
year.  Although in less pronounced form, the proportion of skilled jobs in the public sector has risen in all Latin
American countries.
Table 3. Labor Intensity and Composition Indicators

















Argentina (1996) 0.80 1.16 0.63 1.22 0.83 1.10 0.74 b 1.19 b
Bolivia (1995) 0.60 1.23 0.59 1.24 0.61 1.23 n.a. n.a.
Costa Rica (1995) 0.93 1.03 0.67 1.15 1.14 0.94 0.71 1.14
MØxico (1994) 1.22 0.95 1.05 0.98 1.15 0.93 0.81 1.12
Perœ (1996) 0.56 1.40 0.63 1.36 0.45 1.09 0.77 c 0.93 c
Venezuela (1995) 0.64 1.24 0.59 1.26 0.67 1.21 0.83 1.06
a Without agriculture and government
b 1980 (1996 information not available)
c 1985 (1996 information not available)
Source: Apendix 2.
But public sector reforms and the shift toward a service economy provide only part of the explanation of the bias
toward skilled labor--and not even the most important part.  As many studies have established for several
economies in Latin America and other regions, the incorporation of new technologies via investment in machinery
and equipment is the factor that has had the greatest influence during the past decade in shifting labor demand
toward workers who have higher skill levels. Apart from any technological change or change in productivity,
relative demand for skilled labor (vs. unskilled) tends to be associated with physical investment, since capital and
skilled labor are complementary in price and quantity, while capital and unskilled labor are substitutes for each
                                                
39  See Lindbeck and Snower (1991) for a detailed theoretical discussion.  De Wit (1993) presents a useful summary of theories and
empirical evidence.  Lubell (1991) discusses the validity of the traditional association between informality and duality.22
other (and the substitutability is higher at lower levels of education).40  Technological change, which in reality is
usually associated with investment in machinery and equipment, seems to have magnified the bias toward skilled
labor.  This effect has been especially pronounced in the countries that have opened their economies to foreign
trade, and has occurred not only because of the increase in the stock of imported machinery, but also because of
improved access to inputs and increased competitive pressure.41
This discussion suggests that, in the presence of technological changes and increases in the intensity of capital use,
relative demand for skilled labor may rise more in the tradable than in the nontradable sectors although, on
average, the latter are more skilled-labor-intensive and even though countries are shifting toward a service
economy.  This was the case in Argentina and Peru, as demonstrated by the (ex-post) elasticities of labor demand
presented in Table 4.  These calculations reveal, further, two points that are consistent with the preceding line of
reasoning: (1) all the elasticities of skilled employment are greater than those of unskilled employment, and (2) for
unskilled employment, the elasticities are lower in the tradable than in the nontradable sectors.  In addition, these
calculations show that, for the periods of a decade or longer that were used in the calculations, the elasticities of
labor demand are positive (except for unskilled employment in the tradable sectors in Argentina) and, in fact,
higher than one in most cases.  There is no evidence, therefore, of massive elimination of jobs, or of a pattern of
medium-term growth that is especially labor-thrifty.  Reductions in employment, when they have occurred, have
been concentrated in specific sectors and periods.42
Table 4. Observed Labor Elasticity over GDP























Argentina (1980-96) 12.2 4.3 3.5 -1.1 1.0 1.6 0.2 1.2 1.7 1.1
Bolivia (1986-95) 2.2 2.8 5.6 1.2 1.8 -3.9 4.3 3.6 1.8 4.0
Costa Rica (1981-95) 1.6 1.7 2.3 1.0 1.0 0.7 3.4 3.7 1.9 3.4
Mexico (1984-94) 2.4 2.1 3.3 1.4 0.7 2.1 2.4 2.1 1.9 2.0
                                                
40  An excellent theoretical and empirical summary on the subject can be found in Hamermesh (1993).  The complementarity between
capital and skilled labor, and the substitutability between capital and unskilled labor has been verified specifically in Latin America for the
case of Colombia by CÆrdenas and GutiØrrez (1997) and (somewhat indirectly) for Mexico by Cragg and Epelbaum (1995) and by Caæonero
and Werner (1996).  In a panel of countries, the complementarity hypothesis was corroborated in an earlier study by the IADB prepared
by Flug and Hercowitz (1996), whose basic estimates have been reproduced as part of the econometric appendix to this article.
41  Concerning the bias in technological change in the countries of Latin America, see Tam and Batra (1997) and Robbins (1996).
42  For greater detail on the changes in employment by sectors, see Appendix 2.23
Peru (1985-96) 4.7 3.4 -4.8 1.0 1.8 -3.1 1.7 3.2 -1.5 1.8
Venezuela (1981-95) 3.1 29.8 3.3 0.0 5.8 0.4 2.4 0.3 2.4 1.6
a Without agriculture and government
Source: Apendix 2.
Wider wage differentials
Not enough information is available to enable us to make an econometric analysis of the determinants of relative
wages by skills level at the urban or national level.43  However, there is valuable evidence about pay scales within
the manufacturing sector, both at the world level and in Latin America.  Estimates (summarized in Table A3.6
of the Appendix) confirm that relative remuneration between skilled and unskilled workers, or between white-
collar and blue-collar workers in industry (differentials usually associated with differences in skills44) have been
positively and very significantly associated with the stock of imported machinery and equipment.45  The association
found is consistent with the hypothesis of complementarity between capital and skilled labor, and with the
technological change incorporated into the imported machinery that is biased toward this type of work.  Earlier
studies have found similar results in what is frequently termed as ￿skill-enhancing trade.￿46
6. What has been the effect of changes in trade patterns?
We have argued in this study that changes in the composition of the demand for labor and the relative pay scales
between skilled and unskilled workers resulted especially from changes in relative prices between the tradable and
nontradable sectors, changes in the levels of investment in machinery and equipment, and the higher productivity
and technology associated with them.  In this regard, the opening up of trade had an important impact on labor-
related transformations in the region, insofar as it contributed to these changes.  In fact, we can observe that as
soon as economies became more open, a clear pattern emerges of recovery in investment and productivity and
a decline in the relative price of the tradables.47
But the changes in trade patterns caused by the apertura do not show up in this analysis.  Specifically, we have not
taken into account the fact that in the wake of the apertura, trade deficits soared in most Latin American countries
(a counterpart to the heavier inflows of capital) and that this could have affected the demand for labor.  The
approach traditionally used to measure the impacts of changes in trade on employment has consisted of using
                                                
43  This would require regular series of household surveys.
44  An association that is not necessarily correct, since the composition of demand by educational level can also change within these
groups, as it may already have.  Hamermesh (1993) contains a full discussion about the problems with this association.
45  For Latin America, it has also been found that relative wages and salaries have been positively associated with the size of the tradable
sector, over time within the countries considered (not between countries).  Although this could be interpreted as evidence that expansion
of the tradable sector leads to an additional bias in relative demand for skilled labor, one must be careful about making such an
interpretation, because of the relative wages used.  It could also imply that the skills of white-collar workers in manufacturing are more
specific to the sector than are the skills of the blue-collar workers, or that the supply of the former is more rigid than the supply of the
latter.
46  See in particular Robbins (1996) for a group of Latin American countries.
47  The connection between the apertura, productivity, and investment was analyzed in Lora and Barrera (1997).24
fixed coefficients of the labor content (direct or total) of export and import products to estimate the number of
jobs created (or abolished) by the increases (or reductions) in net exports for each sector.  Were we to follow this
method, we would conclude that the apertura has led to a massive elimination of jobs in most Latin American
economies, since it was from that moment on that external trade deficits increased.  But, as we have seen, no such
￿destruction￿ of jobs has been observed.  Obviously, this has been possible because employment has risen in the
nontradable sectors and because, in many cases, the tradable sectors have expanded to respond to growing
domestic demands (generated by higher growth rates and productivity gains), despite the deterioration in their
external balance of trade.  Therefore, the traditional approach to employment accounting is simply not adequate,
because it does not capture the interactions of general equilibrium that are necessarily part of the phenomenon
of apertura.
Seen from the opposite angle, another broad stream of economic studies has taken the position that the labor-
related effects of greater trade openness can be analyzed by looking at the changes in relative remuneration of the
various kinds of work and considering them with respect to capital and other factors.  Prior to the apertura, relative
remuneration depended on the relative factor endowments in the country in question, while after the apertura,
these were determined by worldwide relative remuneration (which, in turn, depend on worldwide relative
endowments).  According to this approach, it is to be expected that the apertura would raise relative remuneration
of the factors that are abundant in a given country and reduce it for those that are scarce.  In Latin America, such
a development would have entailed changes in relative wages in the direction opposite to what has usually been
observed.48  It would also have implied that, among tradable goods, those most intensive in capital and skilled
labor would have become cheaper, and those intensive in unskilled labor would have become more expensive,
something that has also not been observed.49
It is not the purpose of this article to explain the predictive failure of this theory, its solidity being beyond any
discussion on the theoretical plane.  Among the arguments that have been bandied about we should, however,
mention the following: (1) the relative endowments in Latin America may not be the ones assumed in the
preceding paragraph, since they may be fairly similar to the worldwide pattern for the group of countries, and may
differ in various ways for each individual country.50  (2) protection of domestic industry in Latin America was not
homogeneous for all goods--those sectors that made most intensive use of unskilled labor 51were protected much
more heavily; and (3) conventional predictions cannot be proven directly because they are highly qualified when
one takes into account the existence of nontradable sectors, imported goods that compete partially with domestic
production, and the complementarity among factors, particularly between capital and skilled labor.52
Whatever the explanation, the existing studies for Latin America concur in their findings that changes in trade
patterns influenced employment and labor remuneration, not via the feared displacements of workers brought
about by higher imports, nor through the changes in relative remuneration forecast by conventional theories of
international trade but via their effect on investment, technology and relative demand for skilled labor, along the
lines that we have argued in this article.  Appendix 4 presents (in text form) a simple model that enables us to
analyze this approach in a more systematic fashion, taking into account the general equilibrium interactions that
occur under the different models.  Throughout this study we have made almost no mention of the effect of labor-
related rigidities (wage stickiness, or constraints on hiring and firing).  This omission has enabled us to simplify
the analysis while holding always to the assumption that the labor markets in Latin America are relatively flexible.
                                                
48  It would also entail lower remuneration for capital, which has indeed been observed, and higher remuneration for natural resources,
of which there is no significant evidence.
49  Many studies have reached the conclusion that the predictions of this trade theory have not proven true.  For Latin American
countries, see the empirical studies by Hanson and Harrison (1995), Robbins (1996), and Robinson and Thierfelder (1996), and the
summary presented by Wood (1997).
50  Wood (1997) and Londoæo, Spilimbego and SzØkely (1997).
51  Wood (1997) and Revenga and Montenegro (1995).
52   Robinson and Thierfelder (1996), Caæonero and Werner (1996) and Robbins (1996).25
 Obviously, this was an expositive recourse, not an exact description of reality.  In the model described in the
appendix, we consider the possibilities that such rigidity exists and we examine the ways in which they alter the
conclusions outlined above.26
7. Topics for discussion
In this article, we have analyzed the relationship between changes in orientation of macro policies and
transformations in the field of labor during the past decade in Latin America.  Stabilization and structural reforms
have helped push down the relative prices of tradable goods and boost the stocks of machinery and equipment,
as well as productivity levels, due to the effects they produced on capital flows, the real exchange rate, and the user
cost of capital--and also because they facilitated the functioning of markets, thus improving efficiency.  As a result,
employment has shifted toward the services sector and the informal labor market has gained a bigger role. 
Demand showed a bias toward skilled labor, and the gaps in remuneration among workers widened.  The subjects
we have discussed suggest several starting points for a debate on macroeconomic policy.
Macro instability and employment instability
The apertura and heavier capital flows may have led to higher labor turnover and the perception of greater
employment-related risks, especially among workers at the smaller or independent companies, who now face more
uncertainty. In other words, it may be presumed that the demand for macro satbility and social protection has
increased. Thus it is appropriate to debate whether the fiscal and monetary policies (which were not the subject
of this article) have operated appropriately in countering the sources of external instability or whether they have,
instead, reinforced them by procyclical behavior.  It would be a good idea, then to discuss which macroeconomic
mechanisms should be used in the future to reduce those instabilities.  Furthermore, since the conditions of risk
do not affect workers in different sectors or occupations equally, it is worth discussing the question of whether
the present systems of labor protection are adequate, or whether broader mechanisms for socializing the risks--
mechanisms that would not hamper labor mobility--should be developed in their place.
Stabilization of the inflation rate, and wage stickiness
In countries where the inflation rate has been substantially reduced, real wages may have lost the flexibility that
inflation had, in fact, introduced.  Rigidities in the mechanisms for negotiating and setting nominal wages have
become more critical.  Therefore, we should ask ourselves whether greater labor flexibility is needed in these cases
and what conflicts this might provoke with the objectives of protection and stability in employment and income.
Tax, employment, and incomes policies
Payroll taxes and social security contributions are common in the tax structures in Latin America, as is favorable
tax treatment of investment.  These structures foster the adoption by formal companies of technologies that are
intensive in capital and skilled labor (and promote the opposite in informal enterprises).  Are these the most
suitable structures for job creation, for a reduction of inequities in remuneration, and for labor protection?  Might
it be desirable to replace payroll taxes with higher taxes on consumption, or levies on specific products (gasoline,
for example)?  Alternatively, would it be a good idea to change the payroll tax system so that rates rise with salary
levels, so as to encourage the employment of unskilled workers vis-￿-vis skilled workers, thereby countering the
effect that investment produces?  Or would it be better to eliminate the tax advantages that favor investment, even
though they may be desirable as mechanisms for stimulating technological development?27
Credit markets and the informal economy
Because of the flaws in the credit markets, returns on capital in small companies and in self-employment can be
very high.  That is why workers who have been able to accumulate large volumes of savings choose this option,
to take advantage of those returns.  If that is the case, the imperfections in the credit markets may be an important
factor in explaining the composition of employment and remuneration.  Have these flaws changed as a result of
recent financial reforms?  Should policies be adopted to correct them?
Government spending on education and training programs
It is widely accepted that, not only should spending on education be made more efficient, it should be reoriented
toward elementary education.  But the results of this study suggest that the real restriction on economic growth
and improvements in distribution is the scarcity of workers who have the higher-level skills.  Therefore, should
this idea be revisited?
Should we encourage plans for training and apprenticeship on the job, in order to try to correct the current
maladjustments between labor supply and demand?  Should this be done by setting minimum requirements for
employment of apprentices, or some other mechanism?  Should employers be required to spend a certain
minimum on personnel training, an allocation that might be partly or wholly substituted by a tax that is earmarked
for a public training fund?28
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Appendix 1
Definition and Sources of the Most Important Statistic Variables
Capital Inflows: Change in international reserves minus external current account balance. Source: ESDB-IDB
Changes in production’s composition: Sum of the absolute values of the differences between GDP growth and growth
in each of the three folowing production sectors: commerce, housing and manufacturing).
Changes of total factor productivity: the residual of the growth equation coming from the Cobb-Douglass equation:
p = g -  α rk - (1 -   ) rh
where p is the total factor productivity, g the growth rate, alpha the share of capital in income, rk the physical capita stock
growth rate and rh the human capital growth rate, which is defined as the product of labor force and her schooling years.
Rk comes from IEC Capital Stock Data, World Bank, 1993, updated with gross investment data from the World Bank
(mantaining for each country the depreciation rate of the capital estimated from the stock capital and investment data). To
calculate rh, labor force series coming from the World Tables, World Bank,  updated with ESBD-IDB data,  were used, and
schooling series of population older than 25 years coming from the ESBD-IDB. Alpha is assumed as 0.4
Employment: calculated from data on labor force and unemployment. This estimation of employment may not correspond
to those produced by the statistical office of the countris whose methodologies and coverage are heterogeneous.
Formal employment in the private sector: employment on enterprises with more than 5 or ten workers, depending on
the country.
GDP: Source: ESDB-IDB
Informal employment: self-employed, employment in small enterprises and domestic service.
Machinery and equipment stock: Accumulated stock in US constant dollars of imported machinery and equipment, with
6% lineal depreciation. Source: ECLAC,  Yearbook Statistic for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile, 1968
to 1996.
Open trade reform (year of): Source: IDB (1996), 2nd part.
Permanent GDP: Constant GDP filtered with the Hodrick-Prescott method.
Real exchange rate index: Source: ESDB-IDB
Real wage: Source: ESDB-IDB
Relative price index (tradables / non tradables): retail price index over consumer price index. Souce: ESDB-IDB
Relative real wages (Skilled / unskilled): White collar / blue collar wages in the manufacturing sector. Source: National
statistical offices. In Flug and Hercowitz the information comes from ILO, October Inquiry, between 1983 untill 1994
Service employment: employment in housing and other services. Source: ILO
Skilled / unskilled labor: ratio of the wage of professionals, thecnitians, administration employees, to factory and transport
employees. Source: ILO.
Structural reforms index: Source: IDB (1997), 2nd part.
Transitory GDP: Difference between GDP and permanent GDP.32
Unemployment Rate (urban): Source: Statistical yearbook for Latin aAmerica and the Caribbean  and ILO, complemented
with national sources.
User cost of capital: Source of the variables: IDB (tax and tariffs), IMF (interest rates) and ECLAC (relative prices prices
and real exchange rates). The user cost of capital is the cost of one additional unit of capital when the firm is maximizing
profits, and is given by
Where the cost (UC) is affected taxes (marginal income tax , the VAT and the tariffs: the first term of the right hand),
relatives prices between price of capital and income price (the second term), an depreciation (delta).
















# Skilled / # Unskilled





1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996
Agriculture 2.94 0.24 -14.60% 29.98 49.81 3.22% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.04
Minning NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manufacturing 1.83 1.43 -1.54% 36.95 60.26 3.10% 1.01 0.71 1.10 0.92 1.06 0.81
Electricity 2.50 1.53 -3.04% 23.43 98.87 15.48% 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.14
Housing 2.10 1.06 -4.20% 16.09 29.40 3.84% 0.31 0.15 0.70 0.48 0.54 0.30
Commerce 1.50 1.56 0.27% 33.96 69.60 4.59% 10.46 8.15 15.60 9.11 13.43 8.59
Transport and Communications 1.65 1.41 -0.97% 22.63 61.47 6.45% 0.97 1.81 2.05 2.37 1.59 2.07
Financial Services 1.33 1.53 0.91% 264.36 200.67 -1.71% 1.55 1.54 0.33 0.52 0.84 1.07
Government and other Services 2.38 1.37 -3.39% 49.96 82.21 3.16% 1.40 1.32 1.12 1.38 1.24 1.35
Total 1.97 1.49 -1.72% 42.73 76.17 3.68% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 2.29 0.63 -7.71% 36.91 60.09 3.09% 0.76 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.80 0.58
Tradables without agriculture 1.83 1.43 -1.54% 36.95 60.26 3.10% 0.93 0.64 1.02 0.83 0.98 0.81
Non Tradables 1.84 1.41 -1.64% 45.23 80.85 3.70% 1.14 1.26 1.10 1.18 1.12 1.22
Non tradables without government 1.85 1.56 -1.04% 40.35 73.74 3.84% 1.08 1.71 1.13 1.61 1.78 1.69
Source: National Housing Survey34
Table A.2.1b
Argentina
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996 1980 1996
Agriculture 2.43  NA 1.93  NA 2.06  NA 12.0 14.9 6.7 8.6 6.22 4.01
Minning NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manufacturing 0.83  NA 0.69  NA 0.73  NA 13.3 13.6 6.7 5.7 12.21 (1.14)
Electricity -  NA 0.39  NA 0.34  NA 13.9 13.8 6.5 5.8 3.07 (1.15)
Housing 1.18  NA 1.34  NA 1.37  NA 13.6 13.0 5.4 5.4 (3.05) 0.37
Commerce 1.57  NA 1.32  NA 1.39  NA 12.6 13.6 6.9 6.5 13.65 3.35
Transport and Communications 0.82  NA 0.78  NA 0.80  NA 12.9 13.5 6.7 6.1 3.68 1.35
Financial Services 1.06  NA 0.48  NA 0.79  NA 14.5 15.3 8.2 7.3 1.32 1.79
Government and other Services 0.82  NA 1.14  NA 1.03  NA 13.9 14.7 6.1 5.9 3.51 1.61
Total 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 13.5 14.2 6.5 6.1 4.96 1.50
Tradables 0.84  NA 0.69  NA 0.73  NA 13.3 13.6 6.7 5.8 4.44 (0.30)
Tradables without agriculture 0.83  NA 0.69  NA 0.73  NA 13.3 13.6 6.7 5.7 12.21 (1.14)
Non Tradables 1.06  NA 1.15  NA 1.12  NA 13.8 14.5 6.5 6.2 4.58 1.72
Non tradables without government 1.23  NA 1.15  NA 1.17  NA 13.5 14.2 6.6 6.3 4.32 1.01
Source: National Housing Survey35
Table A.2.1c
Argentina
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
    Employment 1980 1996 1980 1996
Agriculture 1.55% 9.64% 6.22% 892 3891 2975 7811
Minning 2.46% NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manufacturing 0.23% 2.83% -0.26% 179556 280727 485927 465846
Electricity 2.17% 6.68% -2.50% 4701 13223 20061 13374
Housing -1.12% 3.41% -0.41% 31570 54009 196240 183726
Commerce 0.45% 6.17% 1.51% 117967 307489 347336 441781
Transport and Communications 2.88% 10.58% 3.88% 26612 133022 117608 216407
Financial Services 3.94% 5.20% 7.03% 130454 293693 49347 146355
Government and other Services 1.70% 5.99% 2.74% 202281 512742 404849 623735
Total 1.08% 5.35% 1.62% 694033 1598796 1624343 2099035
Tradables 0.65% 2.89% -0.20% 180448 284618 488902 473657
Tradables without agriculture 0.23% 2.83% -0.26% 179556 280727 485927 465846
Non Tradables 1.32% 6.05% 2.27% 513585 1314178 1135441 1625378
Non tradables without government 1.17% 5.07% 1.18% 490860 1082163 1216519 1467489




# Skilled / # Unskilled Labor intensity (total=100)
Sector
Relative wages





1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995
Agriculture 3.11 3.53 1.42% 94.57 42.33 -8.54% 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.12
Minning 1.17 4.12 15.00% 201.71 75.83 -10.30% 0.31 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.15
Manufacturing 1.89 1.87 -0.10% 45.45 70.33 4.97% 1.27 1.03 1.33 1.40 1.30 1.17
Electricity 4.14 3.38 -2.24% 11.46 228.21 39.43% 0.37 0.95 0.73 0.21 0.55 0.68
Housing 1.83 1.79 -0.24% 22.21 32.94 4.48% 1.83 1.50 4.58 5.33 3.25 2.90
Commerce 1.60 2.01 2.53% 38.52 53.52 3.72% 1.72 1.92 2.46 2.79 2.10 2.24
Transport and Communications 1.30 1.45 1.20% 70.40 88.73 2.60% 1.43 0.95 1.53 1.42 1.48 1.12
Financial Services 2.61 2.64 0.12% 512.42 670.74 3.04% 0.73 1.26 0.05 0.10 0.38 0.84
Government and other Services 2.15 1.49 -4.00% 58.06 271.46 18.69% 1.65 2.18 1.39 0.65 1.52 1.62
Total 1.90 2.07 0.96% 50.35 83.19 5.74% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 1.74 3.15 6.78% 102.80 89.85 -1.48% 0.57 0.38 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.25
Tradables without agriculture 1.30 2.93 9.42% 48.21 70.72 4.35% 0.82 0.58 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.63
Non Tradables 2.17 2.07 -0.57% 50.29 85.30 6.05% 2.27 2.37 1.80 1.85 1.88 1.50
Non tradables without government 2.21 2.06 -0.78% 50.21 88.08 6.44% 1.38 1.59 1.99 1.92 1.41 1.99
Source: National Housing Survey38
Table A2.2b
Bolivia
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995 1986 1995
Agriculture  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 14.0 13.6 4.4 3.7 1.17 4.36
Minning  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 13.1 14.4 6.8 6.1 1.45 3.28
Manufacturing  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.5 12.9 5.2 5.9 2.23 1.02
Electricity  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.0 15.5 4.7 7.4 5.38 (0.85)
Housing  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.7 12.8 5.3 5.7 2.53 1.67
Commerce  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.6 13.1 4.4 5.1 2.56 1.62
Transport and Communications  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.8 12.9 6.3 6.4 2.06 1.54
Financial Services  NA 0.99  NA 1.00  NA 0.99 15.0 15.2 8.5 7.4 4.18 3.01
Government and other Services  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 13.0 15.1 5.3 5.2 5.63 (3.89)
Total  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.9 12.9 5.1 6.2 2.67 1.17
Tradables  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.7 13.1 5.2 5.7 2.06 1.28
Tradables without agriculture  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.5 13.0 5.3 5.9 2.24 1.17
Non Tradables  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 20.5 20.7 7.3 6.0 3.06 1.21
Non tradables without government  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 13.0 13.4 4.8 5.4 2.76 1.80
Source: National Housing Survey39
Table A2.2c
Bolivia
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
    Employment 1986 1995 1986 1995
Agriculture 3.03% 3.54% 13.21% 3781 5171 3998 12215
Minning 6.92% 10.07% 22.70% 2360 5595 1170 7378
Manufacturing 4.28% 9.55% 4.37% 29627 67348 65186 95762
Electricity 6.00% 32.28% -5.13% 231 2864 2016 1255
Housing 5.65% 14.32% 9.42% 6767 22567 30463 68507
Commerce 4.26% 10.90% 6.92% 43115 109411 111915 204443
Transport and Communications 5.41% 11.15% 8.33% 15018 38876 21332 43812
Financial Services 2.82% 11.79% 8.49% 13118 35757 2560 5331
Government and other Services 1.82% 10.27% -7.10% 46276 111521 79710 41082
Total 4.00% 10.67% 4.66% 160293 399110 318350 479785
Tradables 4.41% 9.07% 5.65% 35768 78114 70354 115355
Tradables without agriculture 4.28% 9.59% 5.02% 31987 72943 66356 103140
Non Tradables 3.63% 11.09% 4.37% 124525 320996 247996 364430
Non tradables without government 4.19% 11.56% 7.53% 78249 209475 168286 323348








# Skilled / # Unskilled





1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture 2.01 2.05 0.11% 3.61 5.76 3.40% 0.19 0.20 1.29 1.24 0.87 0.75
Minning 2.01 2.04 0.11% 9.44 25.10 7.24% NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manufacturing 2.08 1.71 -1.39% 18.60 24.93 2.11% 0.50 0.48 0.75 0.96 0.65 0.74
Electricity 1.50 1.96 1.91% 41.05 127.66 8.44% 0.98 0.85 0.99 0.32 0.98 0.57
Housing 1.94 1.81 -0.48% 8.90 11.78 2.02% 0.43 0.70 1.59 2.82 1.15 1.83
Commerce 1.37 1.62 1.23% 27.05 47.07 4.04% 0.59 1.13 0.89 1.06 0.78 1.09
Transport and Communications 1.48 1.40 -0.39% 17.62 47.34 7.31% 0.40 0.54 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.66
Financial Services 1.72 1.87 0.59% 238.85 198.81 -1.30% 0.99 0.87 0.13 0.21 0.46 0.52
Government and other Services 2.60 2.45 -0.44% 58.34 86.85 2.88% 3.85 3.71 1.65 1.36 2.49 2.46
Total 2.41 2.15 -0.83% 25.81 39.40 3.07% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 2.04 1.93 -0.40% 8.94 13.63 3.06% 0.36 0.35 0.99 1.09 0.75 0.74
Tradables without agriculture 2.05 1.88 -0.61% 18.42 24.93 2.18% 0.50 0.48 0.75 0.96 0.65 0.74
Non Tradables 1.74 1.83 0.38% 41.95 62.71 2.91% 1.43 1.44 1.01 0.94 1.17 1.18
Non tradables without government 1.60 1.73 0.59% 29.56 49.01 3.68% 0.67 0.88 0.81 0.84 0.70 0.83
Source: National Housing Survey42
Table A2.3b
Costa Rica
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture  NA 1.56  NA 1.05  NA 1.21 12.2 12.3 4.3 4.6 1.42 0.47
Minning  NA 1.89  NA 0.63  NA 0.81 11.0 12.6 4.2 6.0 NA NA
Manufacturing  NA 1.08  NA 0.62  NA 0.70 12.0 12.3 5.8 6.2 1.62 0.98
Electricity  NA 0.16  NA 0.14  NA 0.12 12.0 12.7 6.0 6.5 0.93 (0.50)
Housing  NA 2.53  NA 1.86  NA 2.10 12.7 12.2 5.0 5.6 (5.19) (2.96)
Commerce  NA 1.66  NA 0.91  NA 1.03 11.5 12.3 5.8 6.2 2.74 1.37
Transport and Communications  NA 0.63  NA 0.96  NA 0.87 11.8 12.3 5.8 6.3 1.73 0.52
Financial Services  NA 1.00  NA 0.70  NA 0.65 13.0 13.6 6.4 6.6 1.29 1.63
Government and other Services  NA 0.56  NA 1.10  NA 0.85 13.2 13.6 5.6 5.7 2.26 0.75
Total  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.6 13.0 5.2 5.6 1.68 0.75
Tradables  NA 1.20  NA 0.88  NA 0.98 12.1 12.3 4.8 5.2 1.55 0.66
Tradables without agriculture  NA 1.09  NA 0.62  NA 0.70 12.0 12.3 5.8 6.2 1.63 0.96
Non Tradables  NA 0.96  NA 1.11  NA 1.01 12.7 13.1 5.6 6.0 1.74 0.83
Non tradables without government  NA 1.34  NA 1.11  NA 1.12 11.7 12.3 5.6 6.1 2.01 0.97
Source: National Housing Survey43
Table A2.3c
Costa Rica
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
    Employment 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture 3.63% 5.16% 1.71% 5616 11360 155777 197377
Minning NA 7.72% 0.45% 162 459 1717 1829
Manufacturing 3.39% 5.50% 3.31% 15985 33806 85945 135629
Electricity 5.76% 5.33% -2.86% 2720 5631 6626 4411
Housing -0.93% 4.82% 2.75% 3574 6912 40144 58681
Commerce 3.06% 8.38% 4.18% 18751 57856 69322 122905
Transport and Communications 6.21% 10.77% 3.22% 4072 17052 23105 36018
Financial Services 4.12% 5.31% 6.70% 13734 28336 5750 14253
Government and other Services 1.94% 4.38% 1.45% 63920 116451 109565 134090
Total 3.37% 5.66% 2.52% 128535 277864 497951 705193
Tradables 3.50% 5.43% 2.30% 21763 45625 243439 334835
Tradables without agriculture 3.39% 5.52% 3.27% 16147 34265 87662 137458
Non Tradables 3.29% 5.71% 2.72% 106771 232238 254512 370358
Non tradables without government 3.66% 7.36% 3.55% 42851 115787 144947 236268








# Skilled / # Unskilled





1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994
Agriculture 3.55 3.78 0.64% 1.38 2.71 7.00% 0.45 0.27 4.11 2.45 2.95 1.27
Minning 1.36 3.06 8.44% 94.70 60.34 -4.41% NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manufacturing 1.94 2.54 2.72% 20.94 30.95 3.98% 1.05 0.81 1.05 1.19 1.05 1.02
Electricity 1.36 2.92 7.96% 69.16 80.45 1.52% 2.03 0.51 1.38 0.35 1.58 0.44
Housing 2.52 3.42 3.09% 10.28 13.97 3.11% 0.64 1.10 1.10 2.71 0.95 1.84
Commerce 1.63 2.13 2.73% 19.00 39.04 7.47% 0.62 0.76 0.89 0.97 0.80 0.86
Transport and Communications 0.81 1.80 8.22% 22.07 48.49 8.19% 0.54 0.64 0.89 0.66 0.78 0.65
Financial Services 2.20 1.15 -6.27% 152.93 347.46 8.55% 1.02 0.34 0.14 0.09 0.42 0.23
Government and other Services 2.12 3.03 3.65% 63.02 83.63 2.87% 1.78 2.25 0.69 1.10 1.03 1.72
Total 1.99 3.09 4.53% 22.85 37.59 5.11% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 1.96 3.04 4.47% 8.15 15.04 6.32% 0.83 0.68 1.77 1.42 1.47 1.02
Tradables without agriculture 1.59 2.80 5.83% 22.37 31.68 3.54% 0.97 0.81 0.97 1.11 0.97 1.02
Non Tradables 1.54 2.03 2.76% 37.93 57.25 4.20% 1.06 1.11 0.73 0.85 0.83 0.99
Non tradables without government 1.47 1.90 2.58% 24.65 37.19 4.20% 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.95
Source: National Housing Survey46
Table  A2.4b
México
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994
Agriculture 1.57 2.24 1.26 1.24 1.39 1.41 12.7 13.5 2.9 3.4 4.44 0.02
Minning 1.79 1.28 0.79 0.53 0.88 0.66 15.1 14.2 5.6 5.0 2.06 5.87
Manufacturing 0.87 0.80 0.61 0.73 0.63 0.75 13.7 13.6 5.3 5.7 2.56 1.34
Electricity 0.24 0.10 0.26 0.42 0.22 0.29 15.1 14.0 5.5 5.5 (0.75) (0.97)
Housing 2.10 1.09 1.12 1.00 1.22 1.08 14.1 14.5 3.8 4.7 (4.42) (2.92)
Commerce 1.48 1.34 0.98 1.05 1.03 1.09 12.7 13.5 4.9 5.5 14.51 2.06
Transport and Communications 0.81 1.16 0.67 0.87 0.68 0.89 13.9 14.0 5.6 6.5 1.77 (0.05)
Financial Services 1.33 0.98 0.59 0.71 0.66 0.63 14.0 15.1 6.9 6.6 (0.04) (1.18)
Government and other Services 0.76 0.87 0.87 0.90 0.74 0.80 13.7 14.6 4.9 5.5 3.28 2.15
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 13.6 14.2 4.2 4.9 2.71 0.90
Tradables 1.03 1.02 1.08 1.04 1.15 1.12 13.6 13.6 3.6 4.3 2.88 0.61
Tradables without agriculture 0.94 0.82 0.61 0.73 0.64 0.75 13.8 13.6 5.3 5.7 2.44 1.36
Non Tradables 0.99 1.00 0.91 0.96 0.87 0.92 13.6 14.4 4.9 5.4 2.67 1.17
Non tradables without government 1.09 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.12 13.5 13.9 4.9 5.4 2.08 0.65
Source: National Housing Survey47
Table  A2.4c
México
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
    Employment 1984 1994 1984 1994
Agriculture 1.12% 4.98% 0.03% 79418 156882.1 5767951 5790037
Minning 0.87% 1.80% 5.13% 50253 64524.65 53068 106929.9
Manufacturing 2.39% 6.12% 3.20% 563764 1294316 2692172 4181808
Electricity 4.78% -3.59% -4.62% 118890 71277.24 171916 88596.38
Housing -1.55% 6.85% 4.53% 115386 291578.6 1122309 2087287
Commerce 0.43% 6.21% 0.88% 585812 1360819 3082755 3485292
Transport and Communications 3.18% 5.62% -0.16% 183487 394352.2 831296 813289.4
Financial Services 4.99% -0.21% -5.89% 334022 324519.4 218412 93397.54
Government and other Services 1.88% 6.16% 4.03% 1809620 4176243 2871400 4993540
Total 2.03% 5.51% 1.82% 3840652 8134513 16811279 21640177
Tradables 1.99% 5.74% 1.21% 693435 1515723 8513191 10078775
Tradables without agriculture 2.39% 5.84% 3.24% 614017 1358841 2745240 4288738
Non Tradables 2.04% 5.45% 2.40% 3147217 6618789 8298088 11561402
Non tradables without government 2.11% 4.40% 1.37% 1337597 2442547 5426688 6567863








# Skilled / # Unskilled





1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996
Agriculture 0.92 1.26 3.55% 8.79 12.67 4.15% 0.17 0.30 3.26 2.50 1.66 1.20
Minning 2.98 2.58 -1.59% 49.18 139.11 12.25% 0.28 0.60 0.19 0.26 0.24 0.46
Manufacturing 1.70 1.44 -1.79% 66.86 110.25 5.72% 0.62 0.65 0.61 0.51 0.61 0.59
Electricity 1.62 1.47 -1.09% 235.86 611.60 11.17% 2.02 0.72 0.63 0.11 1.35 0.47
Housing 1.50 1.37 -1.06% 33.28 71.18 8.81% 0.49 0.44 0.88 0.64 0.68 0.52
Commerce 2.80 1.42 -7.25% 54.03 83.54 4.96% 1.47 1.38 1.31 1.50 1.39 1.43
Transport and Communications 2.15 1.43 -4.43% 87.97 145.76 5.77% 1.32 1.54 0.92 1.05 1.13 1.34
Financial Services 2.49 2.72 1.02% 674.33 724.10 0.79% 0.82 0.66 0.05 0.07 0.45 0.42
Government and other Services 1.93 1.61 -1.97% 164.84 203.09 2.35% 2.63 3.27 0.87 1.45 1.78 2.53
Total 1.99 1.70 -1.71% 60.42 79.27 3.06% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 1.99 1.91 -0.49% 30.09 33.68 1.26% 0.41 0.53 1.20 1.10 0.79 0.30
Tradables without agriculture 2.51 2.12 -1.84% 65.28 112.83 6.27% 0.49 0.63 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.56
Non Tradables 2.03 1.64 -2.35% 71.81 95.51 3.22% 2.30 1.90 1.07 1.12 1.86 1.18
Non tradables without government 2.04 1.63 -2.45% 95.05 130.12 3.55% 1.51 1.36 1.09 1.09 1.00 1.40
Source: National Housing Survey50
Table  A2.5b
Perú
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996
Agriculture 1.39  NA 1.05  NA 1.11 NA 11.8 11.7 4.3 3.1 4.35 2.81
Minning 0.34  NA 0.14  NA 0.19 NA 13.1 12.5 5.5 5.7 (6.50) (0.80)
Manufacturing 0.88  NA 0.83  NA 0.81 NA 12.1 12.4 6.2 5.2 4.34 1.00
Electricity 0.33  NA 0.99  NA 0.49 NA 12.7 12.7 7.5 4.6 0.61 (1.35)
Housing 0.97  NA 0.88  NA 0.89 NA 11.8 12.1 5.8 5.5 1.79 0.56
Commerce 1.12  NA 1.02  NA 1.01 NA 12.1 12.3 5.9 5.0 5.66 2.94
Transport and Communications 0.73  NA 0.85  NA 0.75 NA 12.0 12.1 6.5 6.4 7.56 4.25
Financial Services 0.66  NA 0.69  NA 0.55 NA 13.4 13.7 7.4 6.5 2.01 1.76
Government and other Services 0.63  NA 0.81  NA 0.64 NA 13.1 13.0 6.1 5.4 (4.78) (3.13)
Total 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 NA 12.5 12.5 5.1 4.1 5.19 3.36
Tradables 1.06  NA 1.01  NA 1.04 NA 12.1 12.2 4.6 3.4 7.87 5.46
Tradables without agriculture 0.85  NA 0.78  NA 0.77 NA 12.2 12.5 6.1 5.3 4.66 1.00
Non Tradables 0.83  NA 0.94  NA 0.85 NA 12.7 12.6 6.0 5.3 4.06 2.40
Non tradables without government 0.96  NA 0.98  NA 0.93 NA 12.3 12.4 6.0 5.3 3.39 1.80
Source: National Housing Survey51
Table  A2.5c
Perú
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
    Employment 1985 1996 1985 1996
Agriculture 2.92% 12.69% 8.21% 82367 241479 937116 1905723
Minning -2.19% 14.22% 1.76% 19746 65344 40148 46973
Manufacturing 1.74% 7.56% 1.75% 274499 529010 410574 479815
Electricity 5.30% 3.21% -7.16% 21737 28895 9216 4725
Housing 7.45% 13.36% 4.18% 45718 141378 137352 198611
Commerce 1.93% 10.94% 5.69% 371957 946713 688403 1133186
Transport and Communications 1.88% 14.25% 8.01% 102576 340081 116600 233309
Financial Services 3.32% 6.69% 5.85% 126580 226670 18771 31304
Government and other Services -1.49% 7.11% 4.66% 599342 1112147 363581 547606
Total 1.77% 9.20% 5.96% 1644522 3631718 2721762 4581251
Tradables 1.18% 9.26% 6.43% 376612 835833 1387838 2432511
Tradables without agriculture 1.74% 8.13% 1.75% 294245 594354 450722 526788
Non Tradables 2.26% 9.18% 5.44% 1267910 2795884 1333923 2148740
Non tradables without government 3.18% 10.81% 5.72% 668568 1683737 970342 1601134








     # Skilled / # Unskilled





1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture 3.03 2.63 -1.00% 1.47 4.27 7.90% 0.26 0.41 2.13 2.65 1.65 1.65
Minning 1.34 1.52 0.90% 44.00 107.95 6.62% 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.06
Manufacturing 2.00 1.64 -1.40% 12.13 34.83 7.82% 0.68 0.55 0.91 0.72 0.85 0.64
Electricity 1.51 0.70 -5.33% 23.00 96.15 10.76% 1.33 0.79 1.28 0.49 1.29 0.62
Housing 1.92 1.81 -0.44% 9.38 21.86 6.23% 0.56 1.17 1.08 2.27 0.95 1.78
Commerce 1.68 1.59 -0.39% 13.45 38.13 7.73% 0.94 1.55 1.40 1.99 1.28 1.79
Transport and Communications 1.31 1.52 1.04% 11.67 36.33 8.45% 0.86 1.05 1.93 1.69 1.66 1.40
Financial Services 1.91 1.82 -0.32% 65.22 196.32 8.19% 1.15 1.22 0.32 0.28 0.53 0.70
Government and other Services 2.19 1.95 -0.81% 29.83 75.66 6.87% 3.11 2.42 1.64 1.43 2.01 1.87
Total 1.99 1.84 -0.55% 17.55 44.00 6.79% 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tradables 1.89 1.80 -0.35% 8.90 19.37 5.72% 0.43 0.33 0.70 0.63 0.63 0.49
Tradables without agriculture 1.60 1.57 -0.11% 14.17 37.56 7.21% 0.45 0.32 0.52 0.39 0.50 0.70
Non Tradables 1.73 1.42 -1.41% 21.67 56.28 7.06% 1.42 1.61 1.22 1.34 1.27 1.46
Non tradables without government 1.66 1.36 -1.44% 16.49 45.53 7.52% 1.44 1.26 1.47 1.21 1.46 1.23
Source: National Housing Survey54
Table A2.6b
Venezuela
Informality Schooling (years) Elasticity
Sector Skilled Labor Unskilled Labor Total labor Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture  NA 1.77  NA 1.23  NA 1.35 12.3 11.5 2.4 3.7 5.85 1.87
Minning  NA 0.66  NA 0.87  NA 0.74 13.0 11.5 6.1 6.2 1.00 (1.45)
Manufacturing  NA 0.85  NA 0.82  NA 0.83 12.5 11.5 5.7 6.2 3.43 0.09
Electricity  NA 0.49  NA 0.55  NA 0.50 12.6 11.7 5.9 6.3 1.47 (0.35)
Housing  NA 1.32  NA 1.07  NA 1.14 12.6 11.6 4.9 5.7 (1.56) (0.23)
Commerce  NA 1.39  NA 1.09  NA 1.16 12.1 11.4 5.4 6.0 40.15 10.87
Transport and Communications  NA 1.09  NA 1.09  NA 1.10 12.1 11.4 5.8 6.3 7.15 0.56
Financial Services  NA 1.02  NA 0.63  NA 0.74 13.0 12.1 7.3 6.8 3.46 0.19
Government and other Services  NA 0.78  NA 0.89  NA 0.83 13.2 11.9 5.7 5.9 3.28 0.37
Total  NA 1.00  NA 1.00  NA 1.00 12.8 11.7 5.1 5.7 5.46 1.03
Tradables  NA 0.94  NA 1.03  NA 1.06 12.5 11.5 4.2 4.9 3.16 0.75
Tradables without agriculture  NA 0.83  NA 0.82  NA 0.83 12.6 11.5 5.7 6.2 3.08 0.00
Non Tradables  NA 1.01  NA 0.99  NA 0.98 13.1 11.9 5.7 6.1 10.13 1.75
Non tradables without government  NA 1.22  NA 1.05  NA 1.08 12.5 11.6 5.5 6.0 29.79 5.82
Source: National Housing Survey55
Table A2.6c
Venezuela
Annual Growth # Employees
Sector GDP Skilled Unskilled Skilled Unskilled
Employment 1981 1995 1981 1995
Agriculture 2.06% 12.04% 3.84% 8105 39792 550107 932026
Minning 2.60% 2.59% -3.78% 21777 31156 49492 28862
Manufacturing 2.35% 8.05% 0.21% 87873 259618 724154 745283
Electricity 5.78% 8.49% -2.05% 10576 33102 45992 34427
Housing -4.74% 7.38% 1.09% 39022 105757 415968 483850
Commerce 0.27% 10.91% 2.96% 107629 458806 800418 1203411
Transport and Communications 1.29% 9.23% 0.72% 35419 121892 303555 335506
Financial Services 2.52% 8.72% 0.49% 87774 282770 134587 144037
Government and other Services 2.38% 7.82% 0.89% 321778 923703 1078545 1220874
Total 1.56% 8.50% 1.61% 719953 2256596 4102818 5128276
Tradables 2.42% 7.65% 1.83% 117755 330566 1323753 1706171
Tradables without agriculture 2.35% 7.21% 0.00% 109650 290774 773646 774145
Non Tradables 0.85% 8.66% 1.50% 602198 1926030 2779065 3422105
Non tradables without government 0.32% 9.53% 1.86% 280420 1002327 1700520 2201231








Method of estimation Panel with random effects 
(Generalized least squares)
Panel with fixed effects
Frequency Annual Annual Annual Annual
Period 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95



















# of observations 144 144 152 152
# of countries
(latin American)
(19) (19) (19) (19)
Adjusted R2 .48 .48 .15 .1558
Table A3.2
Regression Results: Unemployment
(Method of estimation: panel with fixed effects)
Dependent Variable Unemployment rate
(%)
Change in unemployment rate (%)
Frequency Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual























































Adjusted R2 0.68 0.75 0.75 0.12 0.16 0.7559
Table A3.3
Regression Results: Macro Variables
































































































Adjusted R2 0.21 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.39 0.51 0.51 0.4360
Table A3.4
Regression Results: Employment Composition













Frequency Triannual Annual Annual Annual Annual
Period 1981-95 1990-95 1990-95 1971-92 a 1973-92 a
Machinery investment /




GDP (lagged 3 years)
1.90
(4.37)































Adjusted R2 0.40 0.13 0.06 0.92 0.93
a Informationnot available for some periods in some countries
Note: The first column estimatrions come from Flug y Hercowitz (1996).61
Table A3.5
Regression  Results: Employment in the Manufacturing Sector
(Method of estimation: panel with fixed effects)
Dependent Variable Annual employment growth in the manufacturing sector
Frequency Annual Annual Annual Annual






































































Adjusted R2 0.195 0.427 0.125 0.368
Source: MÆrquez y PagØs (1997).
Note: The specification used comes from a partial adjustment function:
yt =  yt-1 +  Xt + t,
being transformed in:
 yt = ( -1)yt-1 +  Xt +  t,
where yt is the employment, Xt the explaining variables and t the error term.62
Table A3.6
Regression Results: Relative Wages in the Manufacturing Sector
(Method of estimation: panel with fixed effects)
Dependent Variable Relative wages
skilled / unskilled
relative wages
white collar / blue collar
Frequency Annual Trienal Trienal



























Adjusted R2 0.85 0.38 0.28
a With not available information in some countries
Note: The first column estimatrions come from Flug y Hercowitz (1996).63
Apendix 4
Description of the Model for Simulation of Macro-Labor Relationships
A systematic analysis of relations among macroeconomic and labor variables requires a general equilibrium model
that specifies the adjustment mechanisms of the various markets for goods and factors and the way in which
certain macro policies and some exogenous variables may affect the behavior of those markets.53
In this appendix, we describe (non-mathematically) the structure of a simple general equilibrium model that will
later be used to assess the effects of changes in some macro variables (that may be the result of policies) on the
status of labor.
The features of this model can be summarized as follows:
♦There are two production sectors: tradables (that are exported or consumed) and nontradables (only consumed).
 This division of sectors would not be sufficient if one were attempting to capture the effects of the composition
of trade on relative prices among tradable goods and their influence on relative remuneration in the tradition of
the theory of comparative advantage in international trade.  However, as was argued in Section 6, there is a
consensus among analysts about the predictive failure of this theory in the Latin American experience in the past
decade (at the very least).
♦There are three production factors: capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor, which may be formal or informal.
 These factors combine trough functions of production in three stages: in the first, capital and skilled labor join
forces under conditions of complementarity54.  In the second, formal and informal unskilled labor are combined
under conditions of high substitutability.  In the third, also under conditions of substitutability, the mix of capital
and skilled labor combines with the mix of unskilled labor.55  Capital is partially mobile between the tradable and
nontradable sectors (according to a function of transformation).  Each type of labor is completely mobile between
the two sectors.
♦Endowments of capital and skilled labor are fixed (and can be changed exogenously).  These two factors are
always used fully.  Total unskilled labor also has a total fixed supply, but workers can move between the formal
and informal sectors, depending on the relative remuneration offered by the two segments.56 Total endowment
of unskilled labor may not be fully utilized when it is assumed that there is formal wage stickiness (a minimum
wage that is restrictive in the formal segment) or rigidity in the numbers of jobs in the formal sector (laws that
completely restrict hiring or firing).
♦The factorial composition in each of the two sectors, and the relative size of the sectors, is calculated to reflect
three types of countries, based on their income levels (which, for the sake of brevity, we shall call
poor/average/wealthy).
                                                
53  The utility of this kind of model in labor analysis has been justified, theoretically and empirically, in a number of studies.  See
Hamermesh (1993), AgØnor and Aizenman (1994), Richardson (1995) and Robinson and Thierfelder (1996).
54  Or of ￿non-separability￿  See Hamermesh (1993).
55  See Fitzroy and Funke (1994).  At all three levels, the functions used are of the CES (constant elasticity of substitution) type, with a
substitution parameter that is different at each level.
56  This decision is modeled on a function of constant of elasticity transformation (CET).  This functional form is consistent with the
existence of heterogeneity in the tastes of workers for either segment.  See Lindbeck and Snower (1991) and DeWit (1993).  On the other
hand, it is not consistent with the usual duality theory, according to which the informal workers are a residue that queues up to enter the
formal sector at higher wages, a theory that has been refuted by the evidence of relative wages and by the procyclical behavior of the
informal labor market.  See Maloney (1997) and Maloney and Cunningham (1997).64
♦Consumers receive all the income that the economy generates.  They pay taxes at a single rate, save a fixed
portion, and spend the rest, maximizing a consumption function that combines tradable and nontradable goods.57
♦The government￿s revenue comes from taxes, and its expenditure on nontradable goods is fixed.  Its deficit is
endogenous.
♦The external sector must assure equilibrium in the macro balances: the current account balance is identical to
the value of net exports of the tradable good that, under equilibrium, corresponds to the savings by families, less
the government￿s deficit.  The real exchange rate is endogenous and corresponds to the relative price of the
tradables (the numeraire) with respect to the nontradables (which moves in order to assure equilibrium in the
market for goods).
This model has been calibrated to represent, in a very stylized form, three types of economies, by income level.
 Its utility lies in the fact that it permits analyzing the effect that various macroeconomic shocks may have on the
different types of economy.  The model also makes it possible to perceive the influence that wage stickiness or
rigidities in hiring and firing may have on the formal sector of unskilled labor.
In Table A4, which is part of this appendix, we present a summary of the results of simulating the following four
shocks, which correspond to some of the macro effects that produced the stabilization policies and the structural
reforms:
♦Increase in capital inflows used to finance a reduction in the rates of savings by families;58
♦Increase in the stock of total capital (whose origin or means of financing is not considered);
♦Neutral increase in productivity in the tradable sector of the economy;
♦Increase in productivity in the tradable sector biased toward skilled labor (increase in productivity of this factor
with a reduction in the productivity of unskilled labor).
Among the results of the simulation that are summarized in the table, it is worth pointing out the following in
relation to the macro variables:
♦Higher rates of growth in GDP may be the result of an increase in stocks of capital or of changes in productivity.
 By themselves, the heavier inflows of capital have very few important effects on growth, although where there
is wage stickiness, they may reduce it.
♦The appreciation in the real exchange rate may be the result of the heavier inflows of capital or of increases in
productivity.  A larger stock of capital distributed proportionately between the tradable and nontradable sectors
would lead, instead, to a depreciation (since it would reduce the price of the nontradables, as that of the tradables
is being given internationally).59
                                                
57  Of the CES type.
58  Due to the nature of the model, the results can also be interpreted as having the same effect as an increase in external income owing
to greater exploitation (or higher prices) of a natural resource that does not require any other factor and whose earnings are received and
consumed fully by the private sector.
59  Of course, an increase in capital stocks that is concentrated in the tradable sector would produce an appreciation.65
♦Without changes in productivity, participation by the tradable sector goes in the same direction as the real
exchange rate (increase is depreciation, following usage in Latin America).  Nevertheless, the increases in
productivity in the tradable sector must produce a real appreciation with increases in the participation by this
sector.
With respect to the labor effects of the shocks, it is pertinent to point out the following results:
♦Real wages for unskilled workers tend to rise as a result of improvements in productivity, but can fall as a result
of the heavier inflows of capital or of the increase in the stock of capital, depending on the regime by which the
labor market functions;
♦All the shocks we have considered increase the wage differentials between skilled and unskilled workers. The
only exception occurs when there is wage stickiness, in the event of heavier inflows of capital in wealthy
economies (Argentina resembles this case).60
♦Total employment of unskilled workers (formal and informal) may rise or fall, depending on the combination
of shocks, when there is wage stickiness (and also with differences according to the type of economy).  The variety
of results for this variable explains the difficulty of using econometric estimates to explaining changes in
employment.  The same can be said of unemployment.
♦Participation of employment in tradable sectors moves in line with the real exchange rate (which, as we have
said, is defined in the model as the relative price of the tradables with respect to the nontradables). This result is
consistent with the econometric estimates (see Appendix 3).
♦The importance of the informal economy does not decline under any of the shocks we have considered, a result
that is consistent with what has occurred in the region.  Inflows of capital systematically increase ￿informality,￿
regardless of the type of economy or labor market.  The productivity shocks in the tradable sectors have this effect
in the wealthiest economies, but not in the poor ones.
                                                
60  See an analysis of the Argentine case along these same lines, in Garc￿a Swartz (1997).66
TABLE A4
MACROECONOMIC AND LABOR EFFECTS FROM DIFFERENT SHOCKS:  SIMULATION RESULTS
HIgher capital inflows Higher capital stock Higher tradable productivity Tecnologia sesgada vs mo
formal and unskilled labor market type Flexible Rigid Wage Rigid
Employment
Flexible Rigid Wage Rigid
Employment
Flexible Rigid Wage Rigid
Employment
Flexible Rigid Wage Rigid
Employment
Macro Variables
Growth ~ -~ + +++ ++ + + +
Tradable GDP sharing - - - + + + + + + + + +
Real exchange rate (+ is depreciation) - - - + + + - - - - - -
Labor variables
Unskilled labor salaries ~/-/- + - + - + + ~/~/+ + ~ + ~
Relative wage (skilled / unskilled) + +/+/- + + + + + + + + +/+/~ +
Unskilled labor employment ~ - + ~ + ~ ~ +/+/- ~ ~ ~/-/- ~/~/+
employment sharing in tradables - - - + + + - - - - - -
Informality sharing + + + ~ ~ ~ ~/~/+ ~/~/+ ~/~/+ ~/~/+ ~/+/+ ~/~/+
Unskilled labor unemployment ~ + - ~ - ~ ~ -/-/+ ~ ~ ~/+/+ ~/~/-
Note: when differents signs are on the shells, it correspond to poor/medium/rich countries